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STALNAKER 1968 and LEWIS 1973 advocate a certain semantics for counter-
factuals, conditionals such as:
(1) If Sophie had gone to the New York Mets parade, she would have seen
Pedro Martı´nez.
Until recently, theirs was the standard theory. But VON FINTEL 2001 and
GILLIES 2007 present a problem for the standard semantics: they claim that
it fails to explain the infelicity of certain sequences of counterfactuals, namely
reverse Sobel sequences. Both von Fintel and Gillies propose alternative dy-
namic semantic theories that explain the infelicity of reverse Sobel sequences,
and argue that we should trade in the standard semantics of counterfactuals
for theirs.
I will argue that we can explain the infelicity of reverse Sobel sequences
without giving up the standard semantics. In §1, I present the Stalnaker-
Lewis semantics. In §2, I introduce reverse Sobel sequences, discuss the von
Fintel and Gillies theories, and say how their theories predict the infelicity
of reverse Sobel sequences. In §3, I give my own explanation of why reverse
Sobel sequences are generally infelicitous. In §4, I argue that my indepen-
dently motivated pragmatic theory accounts for a range of subtle judgments
about sequences of counterfactuals. For instance, I argue that some reverse
Sobel sequences are felicitous, and that my theory gives a successful account
of our judgments about these sequences. Finally, in §5, I discuss another po-
tential application of my approach: infelicitous sequences containing ‘might’
counterfactuals.
Developing pragmatic theories of counterfactuals is not just of intrinsic
interest. Reverse Sobel sequences have been cited as evidence in favor of the
dynamic turn: a paradigm shift away from semantic theories that assign truth
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conditions to utterances, to theories that assign rules for updating contexts.1
Hence getting clear about the pragmatics of these sequences should help
us make progress in a key debate about the fundamental units of linguistic
meaning.
1 Sobel sequences and the standard semantics
Before too much thinking, it is tempting to say that (1) is true just in case
all possible worlds in which Sophie goes to the parade are worlds in which
she sees Pedro. This is the strict conditional analysis of counterfactuals. On
this analysis, the context in which a counterfactual is uttered contributes a
function to its truth conditions: an accessibility function f from worlds to
sets of worlds. ‘If p, would q’ then expresses a proposition that is true at a
world just in case all the p worlds that are f -accessible from that world are q
worlds.2
But now consider the following sequence of counterfactuals:
(2a) If Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro.
(2b) But if Sophie had gone to the parade and been stuck behind a tall person,
she would not have seen Pedro.
Intuition says that the counterfactuals in (2) can be true together. But the
strict conditional analysis predicts otherwise. For on this analysis, (2a) says
that all possible worlds in which Sophie goes to the parade are worlds in
which she sees Pedro. Given that there are possible worlds in which Sophie
goes to the parade and is stuck behind a tall person, this is incompatible
with what (2b) says, namely that all possible worlds in which Sophie goes to
the parade and is stuck behind a tall person are worlds in which she does
not see Pedro. So the strict conditional analysis predicts that (2a) and (2b)
cannot be true together.
Sequences like (2) are Sobel sequences.3 LEWIS 1973 made Sobel sequences
famous, and was motivated by them to reject the strict conditional analysis
of counterfactuals. On both the Lewis analysis and its cousin in STALNAKER
1968, the context in which a counterfactual is uttered contributes a similarity
ordering O on worlds to its truth conditions, rather than contributing a
function on worlds. Roughly speaking, ‘if p, would q’ expresses a proposition
that is true at a world just in case all the p worlds closest-by-O to that world
are q worlds.4 Stalnaker and Lewis predict that the counterfactuals in (2)
can both be true. For according to them, (2a) says that the closest worlds in
which Sophie goes to the parade are worlds in which she sees Pedro, and that
is perfectly compatible with what (2b) says, namely that the closest worlds
in which Sophie goes to the parade and is stuck behind a tall person are
worlds in which she does not see Pedro. Hence this analysis looks promising,
and until recently, most theorists accepted some version of this analysis of
counterfactuals.
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2 Reverse Sobel sequences
But VON FINTEL 2001 and GILLIES 2007 raise a problem for the standard
analysis of counterfactuals.5 Suppose we reverse the order of the sentences
in (2) to make the following sequence (3):
(3a) If Sophie had gone to the parade and been stuck behind a tall person, she
would not have seen Pedro.
(3b) #But if she had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro.
Both von Fintel and Gillies say that when uttered in this order, if (3a) is true
then (3b) is not true. But according to von Fintel and Gillies, the standard
analysis predicts otherwise. For on the standard analysis, the order in which
the counterfactuals in (2) and (3) are uttered makes no difference to their
semantic value. Even if you have just said that the closest worlds in which
Sophie goes to the parade and is stuck behind a tall person are ones where
she does not see Pedro, you may go on to truly say that the closest worlds
in which she goes to the parade are ones where she sees Pedro, with no fear
of contradiction. So the standard analysis predicts that even when uttered in
sequence (3), the counterfactual (3b) can be true.
Sequences like (3) are reverse Sobel sequences. These sequences motivate
von Fintel and Gillies to trade in the standard analysis of counterfactuals for
another theory. Surprisingly, they trade in the standard analysis for a variant
on the original strict conditional analysis of counterfactuals.6 In other words,
they want to preserve the original claim that ‘if p, would q’ is true just in
case all the p worlds in a contextually determined set are q worlds. But they
augment this claim with a strong claim about the dynamics of conversation:
as part of their meaning, counterfactuals effect changes in the context. In
particular, counterfactuals impose demands on the contextually determined
domain that subsequent counterfactuals quantify over.7
In (2001), von Fintel endorses much of the strict conditional analysis. He
adopts the claim that context contributes an accessibility function f to the
truth conditions of counterfactuals, a function from worlds to sets of worlds.
He adopts the claim that ‘if p, would q’ expresses a proposition that is true at
a world just in case all the p worlds that are f -accessible from that world are
q worlds. But von Fintel adds that there is a second contextual parameter
relevant to the interpretation of counterfactuals: a similarity ordering on
worlds. He also adds that there is another component to the meaning of
a counterfactual: its effect on the accessibility function f . In particular, ‘if
p, would q’ demands that from every world, there be some f -accessible p
worlds.
More precisely, von Fintel says that counterfactuals “update f by adding
to it for any world w the closest antecedent worlds” (20). Suppose that the
accessibility function of some context maps some world w to a set that
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contains no p worlds. Uttering ‘if p, would q’ in that context updates the
accessibility function, so that it maps that same world w to a set that does
contain p worlds. In particular, the updated function maps w to the set of all
the worlds at least as close to w as the nearest p worlds, by the contextually
determined similarity ordering.
I have said that according to von Fintel, ‘if p, would q’ demands that
from every world, there be some f -accessible p worlds. There are several
ways to understand the nature of this demand. On one version of the pro-
posal, the semantic value of ‘if p, would q’ is a pair of update rules: a
rule for updating the context set and a rule for updating the accessibility
function f . On another version, it is part of the meaning of ‘if p, would q’
that it presupposes that from every world, there are f -accessible p worlds.
On either version, the upshot is the same: once ‘if p, would q’ is asserted,
there must be p worlds in the domain that the counterfactual quantifies
over.8
This dynamic analysis predicts that (3b) must be false, while (2b) can be
true. (3a) demands that there be some accessible worlds in which Sophie
goes to the parade and is stuck behind a tall person. So once we meet the
demands of (3a), there are some accessible worlds in which Sophie goes to
the parade and does not see Pedro. (3b) says that Sophie sees Pedro in all
accessible worlds in which she goes to the parade. So once we utter (3a) and
accommodate its demands, (3b) must be false. But Sobel sequences do not
crash in the way that reverse Sobel sequences do. (2a) demands merely that
there are some accessible worlds in which Sophie goes to the parade. (2b)
says that in all accessible worlds in which Sophie goes to the parade and is
stuck behind a tall person, she does not see Pedro. So even once we utter
(2a) and accommodate its demands, (2b) can be true.
One might prefer a slight variation on this analysis. In his (1997), von
Fintel argues that ‘if p, would q’ presupposes a local application of the law of
conditional excluded middle: that either all or none of the accessible p worlds
are q worlds. If you accept this claim, and also accept that a counterfactual
lacks a truth value when this particular presupposition is false, then given
the dynamic semantics presented above, you will conclude that (3b) is not
false, but merely lacks a truth value. My arguments concerning the dynamic
approach apply equally to this analysis of reverse Sobel sequences.
GILLIES 2007 develops a dynamic semantics of counterfactuals similar to
von Fintel’s. On von Fintel’s analysis, there are two contextual parameters: a
regularly updated accessibility function, and a similarity ordering on worlds.
Gillies posits only one parameter: a counterfactual hyperdomain, i.e. a col-
lection of nested sets of worlds. He says that ‘if p, would q’ is true just in
case all the p worlds in the smallest set in the counterfactual hyperdomain
are q worlds. Gillies then adds another component to the meaning of a
counterfactual: ‘if p, would q’ demands that there are some p worlds in the
smallest set in the counterfactual hyperdomain.
On the Pragmatics of Counterfactuals 565
Gillies predicts that (3b) cannot be true if (3a) is true, in almost exactly
the same way von Fintel does. Once we accommodate the demands of (3a),
there are some worlds in the smallest set in the counterfactual hyperdomain
in which Sophie goes to the parade and does not see Pedro. (3b) says that
Sophie sees Pedro in all the worlds in the smallest set in the counterfactual
hyperdomain. So once we utter (3a) and accommodate its demands, (3b)
cannot be true. GILLIES 2007 concludes that reverse Sobel sequences are
inconsistent: a reverse Sobel sequence “cannot be interpreted without collapse
into absurdity” (28). But the demands of (2a) are weaker, so even once we
accommodate them, (2b) can be true.
Besides VON FINTEL 2001 and GILLIES 2007, I know of only one other
analysis of conditionals that aims to account for phenomena like the infelicity
of (3). WILLIAMS 2008 observes that the indicative analog of (2) is felicitous:
(2a′) If Sophie went to the parade, she saw Pedro.
(2b′) But if Sophie went to the parade and got stuck behind a tall person, she
did not see Pedro.
Meanwhile, the indicative analog of (3) is infelicitous:
(3a′) If Sophie went to the parade and got stuck behind a tall person, she did
not see Pedro.
(3b′) #But if Sophie went to the parade, she saw Pedro.
Williams accounts for these data by adopting a variant of the strict condi-
tional analysis for indicative conditionals, according to which the domain
of the necessity modal is the context set: the set of worlds compatible with
what is treated as true for purposes of conversation. He says that ‘if p, q’
is true just in case all p worlds in the context set are q worlds. Like von
Fintel and Gillies, Williams then adds another component to the meaning
of a conditional: Williams says that ‘if p, q’ presupposes that the context set
contains some p worlds.
It is not clear how to generalize Williams’ theory to an analysis of coun-
terfactuals. It is okay to utter (1) even if you know that Sophie did not go
to the parade. In general, it is okay to utter a counterfactual even if the
antecedent is presupposed to be false. So the counterfactual conditional ‘if p,
would q’ does not presuppose that the context set contains some p worlds.
Williams does not spell out an analysis of counterfactuals. But he says that
the analysis of counterfactuals in GILLIES 2007, though developed indepen-
dently, is “similar in spirit” to his own theory. Insofar as the generalization of
Williams’ theory to counterfactuals resembles the analysis in GILLIES 2007,
my arguments concerning Gillies apply to Williams too.
To sum up how things stand so far: the strict conditional analysis of
counterfactuals says that ‘if p, would q’ is true just in case all the possible p
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worlds are q worlds. Sobel sequences motivate Lewis to reject this story for
an analysis according to which ‘if p, would q’ is true just in case all the closest
possible p worlds are q worlds. Reverse Sobel sequences motivate von Fintel
and Gillies to reject this story for a variant of the strict conditional analysis,
according to which ‘if p, would q’ is true just in case all the p worlds in a
certain contextually determined domain are q worlds, and the same sentence
demands that there be some p worlds in that domain.
Presented with these theories, one might be tempted to revive the stan-
dard analysis. Strictly speaking, the standard analysis can accommodate the
infelicity of reverse Sobel sequences. The second sentence of a reverse So-
bel sequence might be false because the similarity ordering determined by
context changes when you utter the first sentence. The advocate of the stan-
dard analysis can say that uttering (3a) changes the contextually determined
similarity ordering, expanding the set of closest worlds in which Sophie
goes to the parade until it includes some worlds in which Sophie is stuck
behind a tall person. (3b) would be false as uttered after such a context
change.
Of course, it is not exactly in the spirit of the standard analysis to think
that it is so easy to change the contextually determined similarity ordering.
Lewis and Stalnaker explain why one can truly utter (2b) after (2a) without
saying that the contextually determined similarity ordering changes in (2).
They simply say that according to the single similarity ordering in play
throughout (2), worlds where Sophie is stuck behind a tall person are farther
away than some other worlds where she goes to the parade. Given that Lewis
and Stalnaker do not posit changes in the similarity ordering to explain (2),
it seems against the spirit of the standard analysis to posit such changes to
explain (3).
But at this point in the game, von Fintel and Gillies can claim a greater
advantage over the standard semantics: the dynamic approach is a stronger
theory, yielding systematic predictions about when counterfactuals are felic-
itous. For example, it is part of the dynamic semantic value of (3a) that it
effects particular changes on the domain that counterfactuals quantify over.
So the dynamic theory itself entails that (3b) will be infelicitous after (3a)
is uttered. Lewis and Stalnaker may say that (3b) is infelicitous in contexts
such that Sophie gets stuck behind a tall person in some of the closest pos-
sible worlds in which she goes to the parade. But nothing in their theory
predicts that uttering (3a) will make the context be this way. LEWIS 1973 in
fact dismisses a version of the strict conditional analysis on similar grounds.
Lewis considers only judgments about Sobel sequences, not reverse Sobel
sequences. He says that appealing to context shifting in order to explain
the felicity of Sobel sequences is “defeatist . . . consign[ing] to the wastebas-
ket of contextually resolved vagueness something much more amenable to
systematic analysis than most of the rest of the mess in that wastebasket”
(13).
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GILLIES 2007 responds to Lewis:
To see that this kind of story is not the stuff of defeatism we only have to see that
the interaction between context and semantic value, mediated by a mechanism
of local accommodation, can be the stuff of formal and systematic analysis.
To see that this is not a mere loophole, we only have to see that facts about
counterfactuals in context—the discourse dynamics surrounding them—are best
got at by the kind of story I want to tell. (2)
To sum up: Gillies and von Fintel claim that positing changes in the sim-
ilarity ordering is the only way for the standard semantics to account for
the infelicity of reverse Sobel sequences. If that were true, then on behalf
of advocates of the standard semantics, I would concede: we should prefer
a theory that yields systematic predictions about when counterfactuals are
felicitous. The point of the dynamic approach is to provide just this kind of
theory.
3 A pragmatic account of reverse Sobel sequences
However, I think von Fintel and Gillies are wrong: the standard semantics
can account for the infelicity of reverse Sobel sequences, without positing
changes in the similarity ordering. In this section, I will give an alternative
explanation for the infelicity of reverse Sobel sequences. My explanation is
compatible with a Stalnaker-Lewis analysis on which uttering sequences like
(2) and (3) does not change the contextually determined similarity ordering.
Suppose we are enjoying a perfectly normal day at the zoo, looking at an
animal in the zebra cage that seems to have natural black and white stripes.
It has not recently crossed our minds that the zoo may be running a really
low-budget operation, where they paint mules to look like zebras. In this
situation, I might have reason to say:
(4a) That animal was born with stripes.
If you are in a slightly pedantic mood, you might reply with the following:
(4b) But cleverly disguised mules are not born with stripes.
This reply may be a non sequitur, perhaps even a little annoying. But other-
wise, there is nothing wrong with your reply. On the other hand, once you
have mentioned cleverly disguised mules, I would not be willing to repeat
my original assertion. I may even feel as if I ought to take back what I said.
In other words, there is a contrast between sequence (4) and the following
sequence:
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(5a) Cleverly disguised mules are not born with stripes.
(5b) #But that animal was born with stripes.
I would like to suggest that Sobel sequences are okay for the same reason
(4) is, and reverse Sobel sequences are bad for the same reason (5) is.9
So why is (5) bad, while (4) is okay? Here is one intuitive answer: in the
above scenario, (5b) is infelicitous because (5a) raises the possibility that the
caged animal is a cleverly disguised mule, and the speaker of (5b) cannot
rule out this possibility. So (5b) is infelicitous because in the above scenario,
it is an epistemically irresponsible thing to say. Meanwhile, it is perfectly
okay to utter the same sentences in the reverse order, since uttering (4a) is
not epistemically irresponsible when no recherche´ possibilities are salient,
and (4a) does not raise possibilities to salience that the speaker of (4b)
irresponsibly ignores.
Our intuitions about (5) point towards a general principle governing as-
sertability.10
(EI) It is epistemically irresponsible to utter sentence S in context C if there is
some proposition φ and possibility μ such that when the speaker utters S:
(i) S expresses φ in C
(ii) φ is incompatible with μ
(iii) μ is a salient possibility
(iv) the speaker of S cannot rule out μ.
(EI) tells us that if a speaker cannot rule out a possibility made salient
by some utterance, then it is irresponsible of her to assert a proposition
incompatible with this possibility.11 Hence we can use (EI) to explain why it
is infelicitous to utter (5b) in the scenario described above. It simply remains
to be shown that we can use this independently motivated principle to explain
why it is generally infelicitous to utter reverse Sobel sequences.
Earlier I stipulated that the speaker of (5b) could not rule out that a
certain animal was a cleverly disguised mule. One can make a similar claim
about reverse Sobel sequence scenarios: the speaker of the second sentence
of a reverse Sobel sequence generally cannot rule out certain possibilities
incompatible with the content of her utterance. Given (EI), this explains why
it is generally infelicitous to utter the second sentence of a reverse Sobel
sequence.
For example, consider again the reverse Sobel sequence:
(3a) If Sophie had gone to the parade and been stuck behind a tall person, she
would not have seen Pedro.
(3b) #But if Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro.
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Someone who utters (3b) generally will not be able to rule out the possibility
that if Sophie had gone to the parade, she might have been stuck behind a
tall person. Hence (EI) entails that it is epistemically irresponsible to utter
(3b), since:
(i) (3b) expresses the proposition that Sophie would have seen Pedro if she
had gone to the parade.
(ii) The proposition that Sophie would have seen Pedro if she had gone to the
parade is incompatible with the possibility that Sophie might have been
stuck behind a tall person if she had gone to the parade.
(iii) The possibility that Sophie might have been stuck behind a tall person if
she had gone to the parade is a salient possibility.
(iv) The speaker of (3b), at the time at which she utters (3b), cannot rule out
the possibility that Sophie might have been stuck behind a tall person if
she had gone to the parade.
The same goes for other reverse Sobel sequences: ‘if p and r, would not-
q’ raises a certain possibility to salience, namely that r might have been
the case if p had been the case. Ordinarily it simply does not take much
to raise this possibility to salience; often merely mentioning the possibility
that r suffices. Furthermore, the speaker who then utters ‘if p, would q’
generally cannot rule out this possibility. Finally, the speaker of ‘if p, would
q’ expresses a proposition incompatible with this possibility. For this reason,
it is generally infelicitous to utter the second sentence of a reverse Sobel
sequence: it is epistemically irresponsible to assert a proposition incompatible
with an uneliminated possibility that the first sentence raises to salience.12
This way of applying (EI) to a reverse Sobel sequence case depends on the
following: that ‘if p, would q’ expresses a proposition incompatible with the
possibility that rmight have been the case if p had been the case. To make this
more precise: even once the second sentence of a reverse Sobel sequence is
uttered, it is still an accepted background fact that if p and r, would not-q.
In Lewis’s logic of counterfactuals, we can derive a contradiction from this
proposition, together with the proposition expressed by ‘if p, would q’ and
the possibility that if p, might r.
Here are the relevant rules and axioms of VC, Lewis’s official logic of
counterfactuals:13
rule 2: Deduction within conditionals: for any n ≥ 1,
 (χ1 ∧ · · · ∧ χn) ⊃ ψ
 ((φ →χ1) ∧ · · · ∧ (φ →χn)) ⊃ (φ →ψ)
axiom 1: Truth-functional tautologies
axiom 2: Definitions of non-primitive operators
axiom 5: (φ → ¬ψ) ∨ (((φ ∧ ψ) → χ ) ≡ (φ → (ψ ⊃ χ )))
570 NOUˆS
Using these rules and axioms, we can derive a contradiction from the propo-
sition expressed by ‘if p, would q’ and the salient possibility that if p might
r, as follows:
1. p → r salient possibility
2. ¬(p → ¬r) 1, axiom 2
3. (p ∧ r) → ¬q background facts
4. (p → ¬r) ∨ (((p ∧ r) → ¬q) axiom 5
≡ (p → (r ⊃ ¬q)))
5. p → (r ⊃ ¬q) 2, 3, 4, axiom 1
6. ((r ⊃ ¬q) ∧ q) ⊃ ¬r axiom 1
7. ((p → (r ⊃ ¬q)) ∧ (p → q)) 6, rule 2
⊃ (p → ¬r)
8. ¬(p → q) 2, 5, 7, axiom 1
9. p → q expressed proposition
10. ⊥ 8, 9, axiom 1
The second sentence of a reverse Sobel sequence expresses the proposition
that if p, would q. For example, (3b) expresses the proposition that if Sophie
had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro. In order to explain how
this leads to a violation of the (EI) conditions, one must examine what is
common ground when (3b) is uttered, in the sense of STALNAKER 2002: the
information that conversational participants take for granted as background
information for purposes of conversation. The notion of incompatibility rel-
evant to condition (ii) of (EI) is incompatibility of the relevant propositions,
given what is common ground when a speaker asserts the content in ques-
tion.14 Since the proposition expressed by (3a) is common ground when (3b)
is uttered, one can use what is common ground when (3b) is uttered to derive
a contradiction from the proposition expressed by (3b) and the possibility
that was raised by (3a), as outlined above. Since the asserted content of (3b)
can thereby be shown to be incompatible with a live salient possibility, the
conditions of (EI) are violated and (3b) is infelicitous.
One cannot similarly use what is common ground when (2b) is uttered
to derive a contradiction from the proposition expressed by (2b) and the
possibility raised by (2b) itself. (2a) expresses the proposition that if Sophie
had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro. But this proposition
is intuitively no longer common ground once (2b) is uttered. In the zebra
examples, there is a similar asymmetry in whether the proposition expressed
by the first sentence typically remains common ground throughout the se-
quence. Consider the zebra sequences again:
(4a) That animal was born with stripes.
(4b) But cleverly disguised mules are not born with stripes.
(5a) Cleverly disguised mules are not born with stripes.
(5b) #But that animal was born with stripes.
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Once the speaker of (4b) says that cleverly disguised mules are not born with
stripes, it is typically no longer common ground that the caged animal under
discussion was born with stripes. So one cannot use what is common ground
when (4b) is uttered to derive a contradiction from the proposition expressed
by (4b) and the possibility that the animal in question is a cleverly disguised
mule. But even once the speaker of (5b) says that the caged animal was born
with stripes, it is typically still common ground that cleverly disguised mules
are not born with stripes.
Our natural responses to these examples are independent evidence of this
asymmetry in the resilience of common ground information. For instance, it
is natural to respond to (5b) by saying:
(5c) But how do you know that this animal was born with stripes? After all,
we said that mules are not born with stripes, and for all you know, this
animal might be a mule.
But an analogous response to (4b) typically sounds bad:
(4c) #But how do you know that mules are not born with stripes? After all,
we said that this animal was born with stripes, and for all you know, this
animal might be a mule.
And the analogous response to (2b) sounds similarly bad:
(2c) #But how do you know that if Sophie had gone and been stuck behind
a tall person, she would have missed Pedro? After all, we said that if she
had gone, she would have seen Pedro, and for all you know, if she had
gone, she might have been stuck behind a tall person.
I will not defend any general theory of how the common ground of a con-
versation behaves under various conversational pressures. Ultimately, what
matters for my purposes is not the exact nature of the mechanism at work
in these examples. I am simply interested in general arguments concerning
whether this mechanism is semantic or pragmatic in nature.
So far I have spelled out one way to derive a contradiction from a salient
possibility and the proposition expressed by the second sentence of a reverse
Sobel sequence. There are other ways to apply (EI) to a reverse Sobel se-
quence case. The second step of the above derivation appeals to axiom 2
of VC, and in particular to Lewis’s definition of the ‘might’ operator. For
Lewis, ‘might’ and ‘would’ counterfactuals are duals:
(φ → ψ) ≡ ¬(φ → ¬ψ)
However, this duality thesis is a contentious assumption. For now, I wish to
remain neutral about the duality of ‘might’ and ‘would’ counterfactuals. If
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you reject the duality thesis, there are other ways to derive a contradiction
from a salient possibility and the proposition expressed by ‘if p, would q’. For
instance, you might think that the first sentence of a reverse Sobel sequence
raises the possibility that it is not the case that if p were the case, then not-r
would be the case, even though you reject that this possibility is equivalent
to the possibility that if p were the case, r might be the case.
Alternatively, you may be one of many theorists who are motivated to
reject the duality thesis in order to accept the law of conditional excluded
middle.15 In other words, you may think that one of the following must hold:
that if p were the case, then r would be the case, or that if p were the case,
then not-r would be the case. In that case, you will likely think that it does
not take much to raise the possibility that the first of these is true, and you
will likely accept that ‘if p and r were the case, then not-q would be the case’
raises the possibility that if p were the case, then r would be the case. Given
that there are possible p worlds, it is again possible to derive a contradiction
between this salient possibility and the proposition expressed by the second
sentence in the reverse Sobel sequence. Simply replace steps 1–2 of the above
derivation with the following:
1a. p → r salient possibility
1b. (¬r ∧ r) ⊃ ⊥ axiom 1
1c. ((p → ¬r) ∧ (p → r)) ⊃ (p → ⊥) 1b, rule 2
1d. ¬(p → ⊥) assumption
2. ¬(p → ¬r) 1, 3, 4, axiom 1
The proposition that if p, would r is stronger than the proposition that if p,
might r. So this alternative derivation proceeds from stronger assumptions.
But the derivation does not appeal to the duality of ‘might’ and ‘would’
counterfactuals.
To sum up: independently of various semantic assumptions, one can show
that reverse Sobel sequence cases fit the conditions stated in (EI). ‘If p and r,
would not-q’ raises a possibility to salience, and that possibility contradicts
the proposition expressed by ‘if p, would q’. Given (EI), this entails that the
speaker of the second sentence is epistemically irresponsible. My proposal is
that the second sentence of a reverse Sobel sequence is infelicitous because
it is an epistemically irresponsible thing to say.
So far I have taken possibilities to be propositions. Instead, you might
say that a possibility is a world, and that a possibility is salient in the sense
relevant to (EI) simply when it is contained in the context set of a conver-
sation. (EI) would then entail that a speaker is epistemically irresponsible
if she asserts a proposition that is false at some possibility in the context
set of her conversation, if she cannot rule out that this possibility is actual.
You might also say that possibilities are added to the context set as speakers
accommodate presuppositions. For instance, you might say that in the zoo
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context described above, ‘cleverly disguised mules are not born with stripes’
presupposes that the caged animal in view might be a cleverly disguised mule.
You might say that (3a) presupposes that it might be the case that if Sophie
had gone to the parade, she might have been stuck behind a tall person.
On this theory, a speaker should not utter (3b) or (5b) because she would
thereby express a proposition false at live possibilities that are contained in
the context set once she accommodates the presuppositions of (3a) or (5a).16
This presupposition-based theory shares a lot with the dynamic accounts
discussed in §2. On all these theories, the first sentence of a reverse Sobel
sequence affects the context by introducing a demand—roughly, a demand
about some possibility—and this causes the second sentence to be infelicitous.
But even this presupposition-based variation on my proposal differs from the
dynamic accounts. There are technical differences: von Fintel and Gillies say
that the trouble-making possibility is a world in which Sophie goes to the
parade and gets stuck behind a tall person, whereas on the account just
sketched, it is a world in which Sophie gets stuck behind a tall person in
some of the closest worlds in which she goes to the parade.
Furthermore, I already mentioned a more significant difference: on all
the dynamic accounts, the truth of the second sentence of a reverse Sobel
sequence depends on what possibilities have been raised. The analogous
claim about the zebra sequence would be that the truth of ‘that animal was
born with stripes’ depends on whether someone has raised the possibility
that the designated animal is a cleverly disguised mule. On my account of
reverse Sobel sequences, what possibilities have been raised need not affect
whether a Sobel sequence sentence is true, but only what a speaker must
do to responsibly utter the sentence. This is a key difference between the
dynamic accounts and the pragmatic theory developed in this section.
4 Arguments for my analysis
One reason to prefer my analysis to a dynamic semantics is that it is an
independently motivated, more general theory. There must be some explana-
tion for why the zebra sequence (5) is bad. Once we have developed (EI) to
account for (5), we get an explanation for reverse Sobel sequences for free.
Gillies and von Fintel, on the other hand, posit semantic rules specifically to
account for the infelicity of sequences of counterfactuals. The rules are part
of the lexicon. (EI) explains the same data by appealing to general, inde-
pendently plausible facts about conversation and reasoning. So my analysis
shares a general virtue of pragmatic theories: it explains more, using less.
Furthermore, unless Gillies and von Fintel augment their theories with a
pragmatic account that is informed by my discussion in §3, my analysis more
accurately predicts our judgments about a wide range of data. I said in §3
that certain sequences of counterfactuals are generally infelicitous, because
generally the conditions in (EI) are met when they are uttered. But there are
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exceptions to these generalities. In exceptional cases, some conditions in (EI)
will fail. It is straightforward for the pragmatic theory I have developed to
yield correct predictions about these cases.
For example, my analysis naturally explains our intuitions about cases in
which condition (iv) of (EI) fails. Remember that (3b) is generally infelicitous
because speakers of (3b) are generally asserting propositions incompatible
with salient possibilities that they cannot rule out. For instance, a speaker
who utters (3b) after (3a) generally cannot rule out the possibility that Sophie
might have been stuck behind a tall person if she’d gone to the parade. But
these generalizations about speaker ignorance do not apply to every reverse
Sobel sequence scenario. In some cases, a speaker who utters a reverse Sobel
sequence may have some independent reason to utter the first sentence, a
reason that would be in play even if she could rule out the trouble-making
possibility made salient by that sentence. She may then utter the first sentence
despite being able to rule out that possibility. In this kind of case, condition
(iv) of (EI) may not hold for the second sentence in the sequence. So my
analysis says that the second sentence of this sort of reverse Sobel sequence
will not exhibit the sort of infelicity typical of reverse Sobel sequences.
And indeed, this is just what we find. Suppose John and Mary are our
mutual friends. John was going to ask Mary to marry him, but chickened
out at the last minute. I know Mary much better than you do, and you ask
me whether Mary might have said yes if John had proposed. I tell you that
I swore to Mary that I would never actually tell anyone that information,
which means that strictly speaking, I cannot answer your question. But I say
that I will go so far as to tell you two facts:
(6a) If John had proposed to Mary and she had said yes, he would have been
really happy.
(6b) But if John had proposed, he would have been really unhappy.
In this reverse Sobel sequence scenario, it is okay to utter (6b) after (6a).
Here is why: I still have a reason to utter (6a), even if I can rule out the
possibility that Mary might have married John if he had asked her. I may
utter (6a) and (6b) precisely in order to get you to rule out that possibility,
without breaking my promise to Mary. In this kind of case, condition (iv)
does not hold for (6b), and so (EI) does not entail that my utterance of (6b)
is irresponsible.
Just the same thing can happen when you ask me for two independent
pieces of information. Suppose you want to know whether the act of propos-
ing would have led to John being happy, and you also want to know whether
Mary really would have been a good partner for John. So you ask me not
only whether John would have been happy if he had proposed, but also
whether he would have been happy if he had successfully proposed. In this
scenario, even if I can rule out the possibility that Mary might have said yes
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if John had proposed, I still have an independent reason to utter (6a), namely
to answer your second request for information. In this kind of scenario, con-
dition (iv) does not hold for (6b), so uttering (6b) is not irresponsible. Hence
my account correctly predicts that (6b) after (6a) will not exhibit the sort of
infelicity exhibited by (3b) after (3a).
No part of the theory developed by Gillies and von Fintel distinguishes
(6) from other reverse Sobel sequences. So they have trouble predicting our
judgments about (6) unless they augment their theory in some way. (6a)
expands the domain over which counterfactuals quantify, so that it includes
some worlds in which John proposes to Mary and she says yes. Once this
happens, no utterance of (6b) should be true. This simply contradicts our
intuitions about (6b) as uttered in the context described above.
Condition (iv) of (EI) may also fail when it is a stable feature of the
common ground that potentially trouble-making possibilities do not obtain.
For instance, even in a philosophy classroom, we are used to ruling out the
possibility that kangaroos might have had crutches if they had lacked tails.
So even in a philosophy classroom, the following sequence (cf. LEWIS 1973)
may be felicitous:
(7a) If kangaroos had lacked tails but had crutches, they would have had no
trouble staying upright.
(7b) But if kangaroos had lacked tails, they would have toppled over.
Here again, a speaker who utters (7a) generally has some independent reason
to utter this sentence, despite being able to rule out the possibility that
kangaroos might have had crutches if they had lacked tails. In this kind
of scenario, condition (iv) does not hold for (7b), and again, my account
correctly predicts that the second sentence of a reverse Sobel sequence will
not exhibit the sort of infelicity typical of reverse Sobel sequences.
So far I have discussed cases in which condition (iv) of (EI) fails. But
my analysis also accounts for our intuitions about cases in which condition
(iii) of (EI) fails. Consider the following reverse Sobel sequence, due to John
Hawthorne:
(8a) If Sophie had gone to the parade and been shorter than she actually is,
she would not have seen Pedro.
(8b) But if Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro.
It is easy and natural to raise the possibility that if Sophie had gone to the
parade, she might have been stuck behind a tall person. It is less natural to
raise the possibility that if she had gone to the parade, she might have been
shorter than she actually is. Of course, it is possible to raise this possibility. If
we have just been talking about whether parade vendors would profit from
selling height-affecting drugs at large events, then it will be easier to raise the
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possibility that Sophie might have been shorter if she had gone to the parade.
I take it that (8) is generally infelicitous in contexts like these. But in other
contexts, we may willingly overlook worlds in which shorter counterparts of
Sophie attend the parade. In these contexts, uttering (8a) does not suffice to
raise the possibility that she might have been shorter if she had gone to the
parade. In such contexts, my theory correctly predicts that (8) is felicitous.
Having seen two ways in which (EI) conditions can fail, we can now see
the exact nature of the data to be explained. Our aim is not to explain why
certain sequences of counterfactuals are infelicitous. Our aim is to explain
why each sequence of counterfactuals is infelicitous as uttered in certain
contexts. Even our original reverse Sobel sequence (3) can be felicitous. For
instance, suppose you belong to a mafia organized to manipulate the exact
movements of every tall person who attends a parade. If I ask you whether
your mafia is conspiring to corner Sophie, you could still have a reason to
tell me (3a), even if you can rule out the possibility that she might have
been stuck behind a tall person if she had gone to the parade. My account
correctly predicts that the typical infelicity of (3b) will not be present in these
contexts.
Our judgments about reverse Sobel sequences are further complicated by
the fact that speakers can signal whether (EI) conditions hold. For instance,
simply in uttering the second sentence of a reverse Sobel sequence, a speaker
may signal that she does not satisfy condition (iv) of (EI). Sending this signal
is especially easy when her audience is not sure what she knows. Moreover,
a speaker may strengthen this signal in a number of ways, e.g. by speaking
assertively, adopting a condescending tone, or responsibly acknowledging
that her assertion has contentious consequences. For example, the following
sequence may end up sounding perfectly fine:
(9a) If Sophie had gone to the parade and been stuck behind a tall person, she
would not have seen Pedro.
(9b) But hey, listen up—I am telling you: if she had gone, she would have seen
him.
Speakers may also signal that they wish to ignore certain salient possibilities
for purposes of conversation. Deliberately ignoring possibilities is sometimes
signalled by a tone of impatience. It is also easier to deliberately ignore
possibilities which are taken to be improbable:
(10a) If Sophie had gone to the parade and been stuck behind a tree, she would
not have seen Pedro.
(10b) Oh, come on—if she’d gone, she would have seen Pedro.
Deliberately ignoring possibilities is a way of ruling them out of considera-
tion. Of course, it may be in some sense irresponsible to deliberately ignore
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possibilities. (EI) concerns only one kind of epistemic irresponsibility: the
kind that comes when a speaker neglects salient live possibilities. If you rule
out salient possibilities by deliberately ignoring them, then as far as (EI) is
concerned, you are not irresponsibly neglecting those possibilities. That is
why (10b) is not generally infelicitous in the same way that (3b) is generally
infelicitous.
Having considered several felicitous utterances of reverse Sobel sequences,
I should clarify the nature of the foregoing arguments for my theory.17 Strictly
speaking, neither my own theory nor its dynamic rivals entail that any se-
quences of counterfactuals will be felicitous. Stating sufficient conditions for
felicity is too much to ask of any analysis; semantic and pragmatic theories
generally only ever state necessary conditions for felicity. This is for good rea-
son: it would be nearly impossible for any semantic theory to state sufficient
conditions for the felicity of utterances, since utterances may be infelicitous
for a wide host of reasons, including violations of syntactic or phonological
rules and innumerable subtle principles about the proper relation between
an utterance and the prior discourse context. In light of these general limita-
tions, some might cautiously prefer my theory only on the following grounds:
my theory is silent with respect to the felicitous dialogues currently under
consideration, while rival dynamic theories are still in need of some princi-
pled account of context shifting in order to avoid wrongly predicting that
utterances will be semantically inconsistent and therefore infelicitous.
That being said, one may recognize a sense in which my theory outper-
forms its dynamic semantic rivals. Linguists often argue for a theory on
the grounds that it predicts whether a sentence is felicitous or infelicitous,
once independent sources of infelicity are controlled for. In other words, it
is common practice to distinguish one source of infelicity from others; a
theorist can then claim that a sufficient condition for infelicity characterizes
a particular sort of linguistic badness, i.e. that the condition is a necessary
and sufficient condition for a sentence to be infelicitous in a certain distinc-
tive way. To quote just one example, BARKER 2000 argues that a proposed
sufficient condition for infelicity explains why a description “will be felici-
tous . . . as long as other independent felicity conditions are satisfied (such
as consistency with the common ground)” (23).18 One methodology helpful
for this purpose is the use of minimal pairs to isolate sources of infelicity.19
The idea is simple: a linguist starts by comparing a number of infelicitous
utterances with felicitous ones that resemble them in almost every respect. By
controlling for possible sources of infelicity, she can develop a more precise
theory of exactly what distinguishes the infelicitous utterances from the fe-
licitous ones. For example, Chomsky’s Binding Theory states only sufficient
conditions for infelicity. But it is predictively powerful in virtue of mapping
the exact contours of our judgments that sentences with certain arrange-
ments of antecedents and pronouns are infelicitous while other very similar
sentences are okay.
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A single reverse Sobel sequence uttered in different contexts yields a use-
ful minimal pair of utterances. By examining felicitous and infelicitous ut-
terances of the very same sentence, we immediately rule out a number of
potential sources of infelicity, including any syntactic features of the sen-
tence and any dynamic semantic features that the sentence has independent
of its context of utterance. It is a virtue of my theory that it fits the contours
of our judgments about such minimal pairs. It is in this restricted sense that
my theory accounts for our intuitions about felicitous and infelicitous reverse
Sobel sequences. Strictly speaking, my claims are guarded: first, my theory
does not need to resort to any context shifting in order to avoid making
wrong predictions about the cases I have presented. Second, my theory char-
acterizes the distinctive sort of linguistic badness often exhibited in reverse
Sobel sequences, giving necessary and sufficient conditions for felicity when
supplemented by the sort of ceteris paribus clause commonly understood to
accompany such predictions.
Here is one more sort of argument in favor of my pragmatic account: my
analysis not only accounts for our intuitions about felicitous reverse Sobel
sequences; it also explains our intuitions about infelicitous counterfactuals
in other linguistic contexts. Consider the following sequence:
(11a) Do you remember when Kate got stuck behind a tall person and missed
seeing Pedro in her first baseball parade?
(11b) #But if Sophie had gone to the New York Mets parade, she would have
seen Pedro.
(11a) is not a counterfactual. But it nevertheless raises the possibility that
if Sophie had gone to the parade, she might have been stuck behind a tall
person. My analysis predicts that (11b) is therefore infelicitous. Gillies and
von Fintel do not predict this. Since (11a) is not a counterfactual, or even a
modal sentence, it does not prompt any expansion of the domain over which
counterfactuals quantify. So the dynamic semantic theory predicts that (11b)
should sound as good as the second sentence of a Sobel sequence.
Unlike this argument concerning (11), most of the arguments given above
are not sharply at odds with a strict conditional semantics. In order to clarify
the limits of the present discussion, I would like to end with a proposal on
behalf of the strict conditional theorist. One might claim that audiences
adopt the following principle of charity: in cases where an audience believes
a speaker is responsible, e.g. cases in which independent signals suggest that
a sentence typically uttered by an irresponsible speaker is in fact uttered
responsibly, one should attempt to interpret the second sentence of a reverse
Sobel sequence as quantifying over a domain so that the counterfactual itself
comes out true. The strict conditional theory could use such a principle to
mimic the verdicts of the theory given in §3: whenever I claim that a reverse
Sobel sequence is felicitous because the irresponsibility typical of speakers of
On the Pragmatics of Counterfactuals 579
such sequences is absent, the strict conditional theorist could claim that the
signalled absence of such irresponsibility prompts a charitable contraction of
the contextually supplied counterfactual domain. I leave it as an exercise for
the reader to apply this sort of pragmatic theory to account for the felicity
of (6)–(10) above.
In discussing the sort of sequences that one might investigate in order
to give a theory of (6)–(10), VON FINTEL 2001 says “I do not have a theory
of when and how the modal horizon can be expanded and contracted by
expressions other than conditionals” (24), and GILLIES 2007 says “I have no
good story to offer—indeed, no story at all—for how or why or in what cases
such shrinkage is possible” (32). Gillies and von Fintel may see the present
proposal as a friendly amendment: the foregoing reverse Sobel sequences
help us understand the pragmatic theory that the strict conditional theorist
should be looking for.20 If they accept this olive branch, my main contention
at present is simply that the investigation of pragmatic theories should lead
us to recognize that the original reverse Sobel sequences that they discuss
have no bearing on the question of whether we should abandon the standard
semantics for counterfactuals. Doing justice to the full range of judgments
about sequences of counterfactuals—whether in the context of a strict or
variably strict conditional semantics—requires a pragmatic theory that is
sensitive to myriad contextual factors not explored by von Fintel or Gillies.
I have developed such a theory and demonstrated that it can indeed account
for the original asymmetry between Sobel and reverse Sobel sequences.
5 ‘Might’ counterfactuals
Our project is far from over. I will end with a few remarks about another
potential application of the pragmatic approach: infelicitous sequences con-
taining ‘might’ counterfactuals. Playing devil’s advocate for the semantic
approach, I will give one reason to think my §3 account does not fully ex-
plain why these sequences are infelicitous. But remaining optimistic about a
pragmatic approach, I will state some desiderata for an analysis of ‘might’
sequences, and argue that the stated desiderata rule against some popular
semantic accounts of their infelicity.
Consider the following sequence:
(12a) If Sophie had gone to the parade, she might have missed Pedro.
(12b) #But if Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro.
How should we explain the infelicity of (12b) after (12a)? Recall that Lewis
accepts that ‘might’ and ‘would’ counterfactuals are duals. So Lewis could
say that (12b) sounds bad because it is incompatible with (12a). However,
we need not limit ourselves to a semantic explanation of the infelicity of
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(12). Given the success of the pragmatic analysis so far, we might expect an
alternative, pragmatic explanation of this infelicity.
However, extending the pragmatic approach to (12) is not straightfor-
ward. There is reason to think that (EI) does not fully explain why (12) is
infelicitous. (12b) sounds bad when asserted after (12a). But in addition, (12)
sounds bad in the context of a supposition:
(13) #Suppose that if Sophie had gone to the parade, she might have missed
Pedro, but that if she had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro.
Something must explain why (13) is infelicitous. And (EI) alone cannot ex-
plain it. (EI) says that it is epistemically irresponsible to express a proposition
incompatible with a salient live possibility. But that is not something that I
do when I ask you to suppose that if Sophie had gone to the parade, she
would have seen Pedro.21
To see this point another way, remember that the conditions of (EI) are
generally met when a speaker utters (5b):
(5a) Cleverly disguised mules are not born with stripes.
(5b) #But that animal was born with stripes.
But it is perfectly okay to utter (5b) after (5a) in the context of a supposition:
(14) Suppose that cleverly disguised mules are not born with stripes, but that
that animal was born with stripes.
The conditions of (EI) fail for (5), but it is okay to suppose (5). So it
cannot be bad to suppose (12) only because the conditions of (EI) fail for
(12). Something extra is wrong with (12), something that explains why it is
infelicitous even in the context of a supposition.
In my view, (12) is not fundamentally different from a traditional reverse
Sobel sequence: (12) is infelicitous for pragmatic reasons. Defending a prag-
matic account would involve defending claims about the semantics of ‘might’
counterfactuals and about the behavior of various modals in the context of
suppositions, and I will not undertake this project here. However, I will state
two desiderata which make trouble for some semantic accounts of (12).
Desideratum one: an account of (12) should recognize similarities between
(12) and (15):
(15a) Sophie might not see Pedro.
(15b) #But Sophie will see Pedro.
Note that like (12), (15) continues to be infelicitous in the context of a
supposition:
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(16) #Suppose that Sophie might not see Pedro, but that she will see Pedro.
Until faced with good reasons to give disparate explanations for these data
involving ‘would’ counterfactuals and future contingents, it seems preferable
to give a unified account of such similar phenomena. The same goes for
conditionals embedding future contingents, such as:
(17a) If Sophie goes to the parade, she might not see Pedro.
(17b) #But if she goes to the parade, she will see Pedro.
Some theorists give a similar semantics for pairs of conditionals such as:
(3b) But if she had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro.
(17b) But if she goes to the parade, she will see Pedro.
If we accept a unified theory of “had-would” and “does-will” conditionals,
there is even more pressure to find a unified explanation of the infelicity
of (12) and (17). Ultimately, these sequences may not be infelicitous for
exactly the same reason. But minimally, semanticists concerned with (12)
should also be mindful of judgments about similar sequences containing
future contingents.
Desideratum two: an account of (12) should explain the embedding be-
havior of (12b). For instance, (12b) is not felicitous after (12a), but neither
is its negation:
(12a) If Sophie had gone to the parade, she might have missed Pedro.
(12b) #But if Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro.
(12c) Hey, look, you can’t say that, because you don’t know whether she would
have seen him if she’d gone. / #Hey, look, you can’t say that, because
it’s just false that she would have seen him if she’d gone.
It is not felicitous to deny (12b) when it is embedded in a question:
(18a) If Sophie had gone to the parade, she might have missed Pedro.
(18b) So would she have seen him if she’d gone?
(18c) I don’t know for sure. / #No.
It is okay to assign (12b) a high subjective probability:
(19a) If Sophie had gone to the parade, she might have missed Pedro.
(19b) But I suspect that she would have seen him, if she’d gone.
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In these sequences, there is a striking contrast between the embedding be-
havior of (12b) and sentences that are generally agreed to be false, such as
(20):
(20) If Sophie were to go to the parade, she would definitely see Pedro.
Unlike (12b), the embedding behavior of (20) confirms that it is false:
(21a) If Sophie had gone to the parade, she might have missed Pedro.
(21b) #But if Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have definitely seen
Pedro.
(21c) #Hey, look, you can’t say that, because you don’t know whether she
would definitely have seen him if she’d gone. / Hey, look, you can’t say
that, because it’s just false that she would definitely have seen him if
she’d gone.
(22a) If Sophie had gone to the parade, she might have missed Pedro.
(22b) So would she definitely have seen him if she’d gone?
(22c) #I don’t know for sure. / No.
(23a) If Sophie had gone to the parade, she might have missed Pedro.
(23b) #But I suspect she would definitely have seen him, if she’d gone.
The embedding behavior of (12b) suggests that (12b) is not straightforwardly
false: it is more natural to negate and deny false utterances, and less natural
to assign them high probability. Explanations of why (12b) is bad should at
least accommodate these data, if not predict them.
These desiderata rule against an increasingly popular hypothesis about
counterfactuals, recently defended in HA´JEK 2007. Ha´jek claims that ‘might’
counterfactuals like (12a) are almost always true:
(12a) If Sophie had gone to the parade, she might have missed Pedro.
(12b) #But if she had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro.
Ha´jek observes that (12) sounds contradictory. He concludes that (12a) and
(12b) are contraries, and that (12b) is therefore false. One may repeat this
argument for most counterfactuals. On these grounds, Ha´jek concludes that
most ‘would’ counterfactuals are false.
In stating desiderata for a theory of (12), I have raised two worries for
Ha´jek’s argument. My first worry: one could use the same strategy to argue
that most future contingents are false, on the grounds that sequences like
(15) sound contradictory:
(15a) Sophie might not see Pedro.
(15b) #But Sophie will see Pedro.
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But this would be an unwelcome conclusion. Some think that past utterances
of future contingents had or have indeterminate truth values. But it is hard
to accept that utterances of future contingents are automatically false. For
instance, most theorists strongly resist saying my utterance yesterday of ‘I
will be alive tomorrow’ is or was false, when I am in fact alive today.22
My second worry: consider again our judgments about (12c), (18), and
(19):
(12c) Hey, look, you can’t say [that if Sophie had gone to the parade, she would
have seen Pedro], because you don’t know whether she would have seen
him if she’d gone. / #Hey, look, you can’t say that, because it’s just false
that she would have seen him if she’d gone.
(18c) [Would Sophie have seen Pedro if she’d gone?] I don’t know for sure. /
#No.
(19) If Sophie had gone to the parade, she might have missed Pedro. But I
suspect that she would have seen him, if she’d gone.
These judgments suggest that (12b) is not false. I think that Ha´jek might
respond to this worry by saying that our judgments about (12c), (18), and
(19) do not accurately signal whether (12b) is false. Ha´jek says that our
practice of uttering counterfactuals such as (12b) is “legitimated” by the
existence of “nearby” true counterfactuals such as (24):
(12b) #If Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro.
(24) If Sophie had gone to the parade, she would very probably have seen
Pedro.
Ha´jek says that since (24) is true, and closely related to (12b), we may
legitimately assert the latter:
There are true counterfactuals closely related to the ones we assert that support
our practice, at least when the prevailing standards for asserting counterfactuals
are somewhat forgiving, as they typically are on the street. So we can legitimately
assert various counterfactuals. Still, most of them remain false. (52)
Ha´jek could go on to say that since (24) is closely related to (12b), we may
legitimately judge embedded occurrences of (12b) as if they were occurrences
of (24). Moreover, we do in fact judge embedded occurrences of (12b) in
this way. So our judgments about (12c), (18), and (19) reflect whether (24) is
false, not whether (12b) is false.
To respond: we do not in fact judge embedded occurrences of (12b)
as if they were occurrences of (24). For instance, compare the following
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sequences, as uttered by speakers who know that Sophie is an extremely tall
and aggressive Pedro fan:
(19a) If Sophie had gone to the parade, she might have missed Pedro.
(19b) So would she have seen him if she’d gone?
(19c) I don’t know for sure.
(25a) If Sophie had gone to the parade, she might have missed Pedro.
(25b) So would she have very probably seen him if she’d gone?
(25c) #I don’t know for sure.
It is more natural to attribute knowledge of propositions expressed by coun-
terfactuals that embed a ‘would probably’ operator as (24) does, and it is
harder to attribute knowledge of propositions expressed by ordinary ‘would’
counterfactuals such as (12b). But our judgments about the ‘would’ coun-
terfactual sequence (19) and the ‘would probably’ sequence (25) distinguish
(12b) from (24). So it is reasonable to assume that our judgments about em-
bedded occurrences of ‘would’ counterfactuals in (12c), (18), and (19) suggest
that it is the ‘would’ counterfactual (12b) itself, not just its ‘would probably’
counterpart (24), that is not false. This leaves open several explanations of
why the ordinary counterfactual (12b) is infelicitous. But it does tell against
semantic explanations of the sort that Ha´jek gives.23
Notes
1 See Gillies 2007 for a recent discussion of the relevant literature.
2 When I am sure it will not cause any confusion, I will cut corners to make claims more
readable, e.g. where ‘p’ is a schematic letter to be replaced by a sentence, I use ‘p worlds’ to refer
to worlds where the semantic value of that sentence as uttered in the understood context is true.
3 Lewis 1973 thanks J. Howard Sobel for bringing sequences like (2) to his attention.
4 More precisely, Lewis 1973 says that ‘if p, would q’ expresses a proposition that is non-
vacuously true at a world just in case some p-and-q world is closer to that world than any
p-and-not-q world. Stalnaker 1968 says that ‘if p, would q’ expresses a proposition that is true
at a world just in case the closest p world is a q world. I will not focus on the details of these
rival versions of the standard semantics, but I will flag differences between the accounts where
they are relevant to my arguments.
5 In (2001), von Fintel credits Irene Heim with the origination of reverse Sobel
sequences.
6 Other proponents of a return to the strict conditional analysis include Warmbrod 1981
and Lowe 1995.
7 Strictly speaking, the accessibility function maps each world to its own domain of ac-
cessible worlds. The truth of a counterfactual at a world depends on properties of the worlds
accessible from that world. So in a sense, a counterfactual quantifies over many domains: one
for each world. I trust the reader to read my claims accordingly.
8 What makes a semantic theory dynamic is controversial. Some may prefer to reserve the
term ‘dynamic’ for the first version of von Fintel’s proposal. I follow Gillies 2007 in applying
‘dynamic’ to theories resembling either version.
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9 I discuss a sequence about zebras because zebra examples are familiar, and so using
a zebra example is a quick and reliable way to situate my theory among familiar debates.
However, our familiarity with zebra examples can create unwanted noise in our judgments
about them. Some informants judge there to be a more marked difference between the following
conversations, as uttered in New York City:
(4a′) My car is around the corner.
(4b′) But cars get stolen in New York City all the time.
(5a′) Cars get stolen in New York City all the time.
(5b′) #But my car is around the corner.
10 One might aim to derive this principle from others, e.g. from the knowledge norm of
assertion and the principle that a speaker knows a proposition only if she can rule out salient
possibilities incompatible with that proposition. But (EI) must eventually follow from norms
more general than those governing assertion, since some analog of (EI) must explain why it can
be irresponsible even just to think a reverse Sobel sequence.
11 Here I am taking possibilities to be propositions. Strictly speaking, one could endorse a
family of precisifications of (EI) corresponding to various necessary and sufficient conditions
for “ruling out” a proposition. For sake of simplicity, I will take it that the reader has intuitions
informed by his or her understanding of this term of ordinary language; my argument references
these intuitions.
12 For simplicity, I talk as if infelicity is a property of utterances. Strictly speaking, infelicity
is audience-relative: an utterance sounds infelicitous to an agent insofar as she takes the resulting
assertion to be epistemically irresponsible.
13 See Lewis 1973, p. 132 for a complete axiomatization for VC.
14 This means that the felicity conditions outlined by (EI) are sensitive to what is common
ground when an assertion is made. (EI) is comparable with other pragmatic norms in this
respect. For example, the informativeness of an utterance—in the sense of the quantity maxims
in Grice 1987—depends on what is common ground when the utterance is made.
15 Lewis 1973 demonstrates that the duality thesis and the law of conditional excluded
middle together entail the equivalence of ‘might’ and ‘would’ counterfactuals. Many have re-
sponded to this argument by rejecting the duality thesis; see Williams 2009, DeRose 1997, 1994,
and Heller 1995 for some examples. See Stalnaker 1981 for arguments in favor of the law of
conditional excluded middle.
16 I do not endorse this theory. Presuppositions are essentially marked by the way they
project through some environments and not others, yet (3a) and (5a) make the relevant possibil-
ities salient regardless of what linguistic environments they are in. But this presupposition-based
theory has a lot in common with my proposal, so it is instructive to contrast this theory with
the dynamic accounts, to highlight differences between the dynamic accounts on the one hand,
and the presupposition-based theory and my proposal on the other.
17 Thanks to Alan Ha´jek for prompting the present discussion of linguistic methodology.
18 For other examples of similar claims, see the account of felicitous indefinite determiners
in Alonso-Ovalle et al. 2009 and the “evidence-based account of the felicity conditions” of
disjunctive sentences in Simons 1999.
19 See Fitzgerald 2009 for reflective remarks about using the “‘minimal pair’ experimental
setting” to control for causes of infelicity not of experimental interest (20).
20 See Moss 2010 for a more detailed discussion of concerns that distinguish this strict
conditional account from my pragmatic theory, and for arguments that such concerns ultimately
favor my analysis.
21 (EI) may have more general analogs that do not merely govern assertion. But since many
audiences suggest that it is significantly more felicitous to suppose than to assert reverse Sobel
sequences, I do not endorse an analog of (EI) for supposition.
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22 This problem is not devastating. Ha´jek simply owes us some explanation for why his
argumentative strategy does not overgenerate. I expect that his explanation will appeal to appar-
ent disanalogies in our judgments about counterfactuals and future contingents; for instance,
truth values of future contingents may supervene on facts about the actual world while truth
values of counterfactuals arguably cannot. I will not address various potential arguments here,
except to say that the abovementioned judgments about embedded counterfactuals suggest that
ordinary language judgments about ‘would’ counterfactuals bear more similarities to judgments
about future contingents than is commonly recognized.
23 Thanks especially to Alan Ha´jek, Kai von Fintel, Thony Gillies, Ofra Magidor, Bob
Stalnaker, Eric Swanson, and audiences at NYU, Berkeley, Michigan, Rutgers, and BSPC 2008
for helpful comments.
References
Alonso-Ovalle, Luis, Paula Mene´ndez-Benito & Florian Schwarz. 2009. “Maximize Presupposi-
tion and Two Types of Definite Competitors.” North East Linguistic Society (NELS),
vol. 39.
Barker, Chris. 2000. “Definite Possessives and Discourse Novelty.” Theoretical Linguistics, vol.
26 (3): 211–228.
DeRose, Keith. 1994. “Lewis on ‘Might’ and ‘Would’ Counterfactual Conditionals.” Canadian
Journal of Philosophy, vol. 24 (3): 413–418.
———. 1997. “Can It Be That It Would Have Been Even Though It Might Not Have Been?”
In Philosophical Perspectives 11: Mind, Causation, and World, James Tomberlin, editor,
385–413. Blackwell Publishers, Ltd., Oxford.
von Fintel, Kai. 2001. “Counterfactuals in a Dynamic Context.” In Ken Hale: A Life in Lan-
guage, Michael Kenstowicz, editor. MIT Press, Cambridge.
Fitzgerald, Gareth. 2009. “Linguistic Intuitions.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science, vol. 61 (1): 123–160.
Gillies, Thony. 2007. “Counterfactual Scorekeeping.” Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. 30: 329–
360.
Grice, Paul. 1987. “Logic and Conversation.” In Studies in the Way of Words. Harvard Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge.
Ha´jek, Alan. 2007. “Most Counterfactuals are False.” Ms., Australian National University:
http://philrsss.anu.edu.au/people-defaults/alanh/paper s/MCF.pdf.
Harper, William L., Robert Stalnaker & Glenn Pearce, editors. 1981. Ifs: Conditionals, Belief,
Decision, Chance, and Time. D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht.
Heller, Mark. 1995. “Might-Counterfactuals and Gratuitous Differences.” Australasian Journal
of Philosophy, vol. 73: 91–101.
Lewis, David K. 1973. Counterfactuals. Basil Blackwell Ltd., Malden, MA.
Lowe, E. J. 1995. “The Truth about Counterfactuals.” Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 45: 41–59.
Moss, Sarah. 2010. “Constraining Credences in Counterfactuals.” Ms., Department of Philos-
ophy, University of Michigan.
Simons, Mandy. 1999. “On the Felicity Conditions of Disjunctive Sentences.” Proceedings of
the Western Conference on Linguistics, vol. 11.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1968. “A Theory of Conditionals.” In Harper et al. (1981), 41–55.
———. 1978. “A Defense of Conditional Excluded Middle.” In Harper et al. (1981), 87–104.
———. 2002. “Common Ground.” Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. 25: 701–721.
Warmbrod, Ken. 1981. “Counterfactuals and Substitution of Equivalent Antecedents.” Journal
of Philosophical Logic, vol. 10: 267–289.
Williams, Robbie. 2008. “Conversation and Conditionals.” Philosophical Studies, vol. 138 (2):
211–223.
———. 2009. “Defending Conditional Excluded Middle.” Forthcoming in Nouˆs.
